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ABOUT FARMERS’ PENSION INSURANCE1
IS FARMERS’ PENSION INSURANCE NECESSARY?
1. When debating on farmers’ pension insurance, two fundamental issu-
es are inevitably raised: 
1. whether the mandatory pension insurance of farmers (and their
household members) is required and
2. if so, whether the farmers (and their household members) should
be included in the general mandatory pension insurance or should
a special insurance plan be organized for this category of the in-
sured?
Ad 1. There is a widespread opinion that the farmers’ mandatory pen-
sion insurance is not necessary and it is considerably present among
the farmers, especially among some (wealthier) categories of farmers,
but the general public as well. This opinion is based on a number of re-
asons:
a) farmers can work on their farms until they are very old, thus pro-
viding for their basic needs,
b) farmers can (1) rent their property to someone else and live off
the rental proceeds or (2) sell and obtain income from the sale
and the like. Reasons (1) and (2) essentially indicate that the agri-
cultural property can be viewed as any other serious saving plan
for old age (bank savings, securities, real estate) so that the pen-
sion is unnecessary for the average farmers,
c) farmers have descendants at the farm, and by working they will
provide a safe old age for the older household, as the case was in
the past. 
The above mentioned reasons in favor of the absence of farmers’ man-
datory insurance possess certain credibility, but closer examination ra-
ises some doubts. Namely, work, especially physical one, is very diffi-
cult for old people, so it's not humanly to force old people to work in
order to ensure a minimum standard of living. Also, labor in old age is
5
FARMERS' PENSION INSURANCE
________________________________
1 I am grateful to Gordana Matković, for the useful suggestions. Also, thanks to Milica Danilović, Raša
Gojković, Ivan Mimić and Željko Simić for useful information.
certainly inefficient, so the question is can the elderly, in spite of all
their efforts, provide for at least basic existence, or will they otherwise
fall into great misery.
Secondly, the reason b) may apply to a large number of agricultural
land owners, but there are farmers for whom this „investment“ plan is
not sufficient. In fact, for farmers with small properties it is possible
that property income does not reach the level required for a peaceful
old age. While, during the working life, the said property could provide
sufficient income by combining return on capital, owner’s labor and
entrepreneurship, the mere return on capital (either through the rental
of the property or through its sale and purchase of annuity policies)
can easily be insufficient due to the modest value of the property.
Besides, the property can be wasted over time, either owing to the fall
of its value due to the deep economic reasons, or because of poor busi-
ness policy of the owners (too much borrowing, etc.), or the owner
could have squandered it. Anyway, we see that even the possession of
considerable property can not guarantee secure old age, due to the
risk that the owner can run out of land.
Even if we assume that the land owner will be able to make a sufficient
income for old age through the implementation of an investment strat-
egy, the question is what to do with other farmers’ household mem-
bers – should they remain dependant on the head of the household or
should they be provided with an independent income. 
„Investment“ reason is particularly weak in Serbia, where the value of
the property is usually small – often only a few thousand Euros, which
is the recent selling price for many properties, if they manage to be
sold at all – so it can not provide sufficient income for basic survival in
the long–term period. 
At the end, the reason under c) is no longer credible, because the de-
mographic transition, along with rural–urban migration, devastated po-
pulation in many agricultural areas in Serbia, so most of households re-
mained without members of the younger generation, and many of
them remained exclusively elderly. Therefore, the old mechanisms of
intergenerational solidarity disappear and cease to be the backbone of
the social security of the members of older generations.
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It is possible that the stated reasons for the lack of mandatory insur-
ance are applicable to a number of wealthier farmers in the developed
countries. But even there, and in particular in Serbia, there is a consid-
erable number of farmers who would not be able to provide the need-
ed income for old age by themselves, without the help from the pen-
sion system. Mandatory pension systems exist precisely for such indi-
viduals, and not for those who provide a considerable income for their
old age by themselves.
Ad 2. There are two important reasons why the farmers should be
included in the general mandatory pension insurance. The first is the
equality of all before the law, which is the highest ranking principle
achieved, if equal regulations apply to all citizens. The other is the
administrative and cost efficiency, as it is certainly more complicated
and expensive to have two programs instead of one. 
However, there are some equally important reasons that speak in favor
of special regulation and organization of farmers’ pension insurance.
The first is of administrative nature and concerns technical complica-
tions regarding determining the basis for farmers’ pension contribu-
tions and difficulties in their collection. In fact, the entire income of
many farmers or a part of it is hidden from tax and other state bodies,
due to the payment in cash or personal consumption in kind, making
it difficult or even impossible to establish the real income that should
be taxed by the pension contributions. The tax administrations of ma-
ny countries have been coping with this issue for a long time and they
have resolved it with partial success. Therefore, there are various inno-
vative and less innovative techniques of farmer taxation at place and
they lead to the distinction between taxes on income from agriculture
and taxes on income from other activities. This problem occurs with
pension contributions as well, and different countries deal with it dif-
ferently. Some countries create a special pension system for farmers.
Another specificity of agriculture is that many retired farmers can con-
tinue to work on their farms, although to a lesser extent than before,
and thus contribute to the satisfaction of a part of their needs. Therefo-
re, it is possible to regulate farmers’ insurance in such a way that they
pay less contribution than others and receive lower pensions than ot-
hers.
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The third specificity of agriculture is that several close relatives often
work in the economic unit called the farm, so the question is how the
pension system should react to that fact: whether only one member
should be insured (the owner or head of household) or all members
should be included? How should their contributions be calculated and
what should be the ratio between their pensions? Similarly, whether
the workers employed at the farm should be insured through the gen-
eral program or through the agricultural insurance?
Let's look briefly at some foreign solutions.
FARMERS’ INSURANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION2
2. There are various different solutions to the farmers’ pensions in the
European Union, and they rely on national traditions. These differen-
ces exist due to the fact that there is no harmonization of pension leg-
islation at the EU level, i.e. there are no pension related regulations at
Brussels level.
In many countries farmers (individual households) are involved in the
general pension insurance plans along with other categories of the
insured, and under the same conditions. This means that they are part
of the same state funds as the others, and they pay the same contribu-
tions and qualify for the same pensions as others. Such a system is suit-
able for small number of farmers in the developed countries, usually
under 5% of the total work force, on the one hand, and for high involve-
ment of farmers in the tax and economic system as a whole, on the
other. There is a social pension for all citizens in Denmark, funded
from the budget, and farmers are also involved in it.
In many other countries there are particularities in farmers’ pension
insurance, which are going to be stated hereunder.
In Hungary and Romania, independent farmers are not involved in
the mandatory pension insurance, but are insured on voluntary basis. 
In the Great Britain, farmers are covered by mandatory insurance,
but the self–employed (self–employed activities and farmers) can cease
8
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2 Based on Bill Birmingham - Rural Pensions in European States, EU-China Social Securiity Co-operation
Project, s.a.
with this insurance if their income is below a certain amount. This
insurance suspension is not later included in the pensionable service.
In many countries there is a separate mandatory pension insurance of
farmers, subject to the individual rules and funding. 
In Austria, farmers’ pension insurance involves the proprietors and
members of his/her family and it is mandatory. Contribution rate is 15%
of the property value, based on which it can be insured. Pension amount
is prescribed by the general rules. One third of the old–age, disability
and family pensions is funded by the pension contributions, and two
thirds by the state funds. 
In Germany, pension insurance is also mandatory for the owners and
members of his/her family (except for persons with short–term emplo-
yment). Contributions are determined based on the value of the prope-
rty. The contribution and pension, in average, amount to less than half
of those in the general insurance.
In Spain, agricultural insurance covers those farmers, including the
members of their family, whose taxable income is defined. Pensions
are financed from contributions, and pension rights are substantially
similar to the rights in the general system.
In Finland, farmers are involved in two pension programs:
• national pension insurance, which covers all employees, includ-
ing farmers,
• a special program for farmers, according to the law on farmers’
pensions, who have at least 5 ha of cultivable land and annual
income of 3,000 Euros.
Pension contributions are calculated according to the calculative earn-
ings, which depends on the size of the property, type of activities car-
ried out on it and productivity (or number of deers).
If the farmer leaves the agriculture, then he/she has the right to the early
pension benefit. This encourages the rejuvenation of entrepreneurs in
agriculture, which improves the profitability and size of remaining farms.
Old age pensions are financed 20% from contributions, 70% from the
state funds and 10% from other sources.
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The mandatory farmers’ pension insurance functions as a private pen-
sion fund, but the state representatives and the insured themselves are
involved in the work of its administration.
In France, mandatory special retirement pension includes both farm-
ers and members of the household engaged in agriculture, as well as
the employed agricultural workers. The additional requirement is that
the value of agricultural property exceeds certain threshold.
Pension contribution consists of two elements: (1) a fixed part that is
equal for all and is determined at the national level and (2) an addition-
al percentage, which is determined regionally (by departments).
The pension consists of two parts: the first one, which depends on age and
years of contribution payments, and the second, which is proportional to
the number of points calculated on the basis of contributions paid. 
In Greece, pension insurance is mandatory for self–employed farmers,
agricultural workers, cattle–breeders, beekeepers, fishermen and vol-
untary members of religious groups that are engaged in agriculture.
Other rural workers with low income participate in this pension pro-
gram, while rural workers with higher income participate in the insur-
ance of private businesses. Household members are insured, although
without payment of pension contributions. 
Pensions are financed from the contributions of the insured and the
state funds, which cover the deficit.
In Italy, farmers’ pension insurance provides rights equal to those of
the general pension insurance. 
Pension contribution of farmers depends on several factors: the size of
the land, the type of land (less is paid for the mountain one it), the
number of work days on the land (more days, higher contribution) and
the number of years of participation in insurance (less number of
years, smaller contribution).
Pension plan also distinguishes between the following categories:
• tenant farmers and share croppers,
• direct farm workers on the property (i.e. property owners who
predominantly work as farmers) and
10
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• entrepreneurs working on the property as their dominant occu-
pation for 2 / 3 of their working hours (on the mountains 50 %).
Luxembourg farmers’ pension fund provides rights equal to those of
the general insurance.
Amount (percentage) of farmers’ pension contributions is equal to that
in general insurance. The basis for contribution is calculated according
to the size of the property and the type of activity performed on the
property (according to the last year’s plant and animal production).
There is a minimal, equal for all, contribution for small farms.
In Poland, there is a separate fund for farmers, land owners and mem-
bers of the households. Participation is mandatory here as well, but for
smaller farms (less than 1 ha) it is voluntary. 
The employed and seasonal workers in agriculture have mandatory
general pension insurance. Farm owners who are engaged in non–agri-
cultural activities (tourism, repair) may remain in farmers’ insurance if
they have participated at least three years in it.
Farmers’ pension insurance provides rights equal to those of the gen-
eral insurance.
Contribution depends on the previous semi annual income, with set
maximum size. The pension consists of two parts: (2) depending on
the contributions paid and (2) the aditional 25% of basic pension amo-
unt. 6% of mandatory farmers’ insurance is financed from pension con-
tributions and 94% from the state funds.
In the European Union farmers who have low pension are entitled to
social welfare.
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BASIC LEGAL SOLUTIONS
3. In this section we will briefly present and analyze important current
legislation in the farmers’ pension insurance field. It comprises two
laws: the Pension and Disability Insurance Law and the Law on Social
Insurance Contributions.
GENERAL FEATURES
4. Farmers’ pension insurance is relatively recent in Serbia – it was in-
troduced in 1979, as voluntary. Until then, farmers were not pension
insured in any way, but relied, in the old age, on intergenerational fam-
ily solidarity, i.e. the work of their children, their own and, possibly,
that of close relatives. Three years later, in 1982, mandatory insurance
of associated farmers was introduced, i.e. of those who have worked
closely with government and social sector in the agriculture, under the
so–called associations. But those beginnings of insurance did not lead
to the inclusion of larger number of farmers – on the contrary. 
From 1986 till the present time, pension insurance for farmers is man-
datory, which means that, according to the law, they are obliged to par-
ticipate in it and pay pension contributions, as well as all other pension
insured persons (employees and the self employed), under the threat
of sanctions and coercive collection. However, as we shall see later, the
nominal obligation does not exist in the practical life. 
5. Voluntary pension insurance in private capital funds is certainly
available for farmers as well, but they practically do not use it.
Generally speaking, mandatory farmers’ insurance is an integral part of
general mandatory pension insurance in Serbia. It is regulated by a ge-
neral, uniform law on pension insurance, and most of the solutions are
the same both for farmers and the other insured persons. Only a few
are actually different, trying to take into account some specifics of the
pension insurance of farmers. 
Thus the law states that those who are required to be insured are the
employees, members of private businesses and farmers. The latter are
defined as „individuals who are, by law, considered to be engaged in
agriculture (farmers, members of farmers’ households and members of
mixed households), unless: the insured employees, the self–employed
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insurance holders, pension beneficiaries and persons in school“. In ot-
her words, the law considers farmers to be the members of the agricul-
tural and mixed households, not insured on other grounds (as employ-
ees or the self–employed) or in school or already receiving pension. 
The above mentioned definition is extensive and may include among
farmers those members of the agricultural households who are not far-
mers: for example, those seeking work outside agriculture or incapable
for work and inactive, and the like. The question is also how to treat
those who are involved in agriculture, but as entrepreneurs, on the le-
ased property and with wage–labor force: as farmers or as self–emplo-
yed, which it is not clear from the legal definition.
Since insurance is mandatory, the law requires that an individual be-
comes pension contributor on the initiation date (provided that he/she
is at least 15 years old), and ceases to be so on the day of termination
of agricultural activity3. According to the current solutions, only one
member of the household is obliged to be insured, while for others the
insurance is voluntary.
However, there is a provision, related only to farmers, on so called sta-
nd–by mode of service, which says that the farmer’s insurance can be
exceptionally put on stand–by mode for five years the most, during the
objective risk insurance period (natural disasters, illness and materni-
ty leave), provided that those can not be consecutive five years. In pra-
ctical terms, this provision means that each insured farmer does not
have to pay pension contributions for five years during his/her work-
ing life, but those years will not be included in the pensionable serv-
ice. This provision has been legalized in 2003, and it was part of the for-
mer attempts to put farmers’ pension insurance on its feet. In fact, by
then, many farmers have accumulated considerable pension debts due
to irregular payment of contributions, and because of the reluctance of
the state to implement forced collection of the debts, one of the ways
to reduce them was this – granting stand–by mode of service, thus
automatically deleting the pension debt for these five years. 
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3  This solution creates great formal difficulties, since it is hard to expect the farmer to stop with agricul-
tural production at the time of receiving the first pension. Moreover, it is considered that a formal require-
ment for obtaining a pension would be for the farmer to transfer property to someone else (the successor,
etc.) and thus mark the termination of his activity, so it is sometimes required, but normally this require-
ment is ignored in practice.
BASIC RIGHTS
6. The farmer, as well as other insured, has the right to old age, disabili-
ty and family pension, funeral expenses and allowance for bodily inju-
ry (in case of accident at work or occupational disease).
A farmer will be entitled to an old age (full) pension 1) upon turning 65
(male) or 60 (women) and with at least 15 years of pensionable serv-
ice, or 2) upon terminating 40 (men) or 35 (women) years of pension-
able service and turning at least 53 years old; 
The individuals with disability obtain the right to a disability pension
when total loss of working capacity occurs due to injury, occupational
illness, injury or illness outside of work, and changes can not be elim-
inated by medical treatment or rehabilitation.
The right to family pension, after the death of a pensioner and pension
policyholder with at least five years of insurance, is obtained by the
widow or widower, if in old age, children when younger and if they are
in a schooling program and parents if they were supported by the
deceased and if they are in old age.
The allowance for bodily injury is obtained for the injury incurred at
work and due to occupational diseases. It may be less serious than in-
validity, but it is assumed that it is necessary to provide compensation
to those whose work capacity is reduced, due to the injury or illness
associated with their work. (Invalidity does not need to be related to
the work place.)
CONTRIBUTIONS
7. Law on contributions stipulates that the insured from the agricultur-
al pension fund pay contributions on the basis on which personal in-
come tax is paid, for income from agricultural activities. However, as
this tax has not been charged for six years, the law provides for back-
up option and prescribes that in this situation pension contributions
should be calculated according to the lowest monthly basis, which is
35% of the average monthly salary in the Republic, for the last quarter
of the previous year. 
Thus we have an unusual solution: that all the insured farmers (should)
pay equal contribution and minimal one as well. Such a solution obvi-
15
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ously denies the principle that everyone pays the contribution based
on the income, because the differences in farmers' income certainly exist,
and pursuant to the legal solution they are all required to pay equal
contribution. Also, a minimal contribution is selected, which means that
the farmers’ pensions, due to the manner of pension calculation based
on the amount of paid contributions, will inevitably be low. Thus a
whole class is condemned to low pensions from mandatory insurance. 
However, the said solution has some sense. Since the tax on income
from agriculture has not been calculated or charged in Serbia for years,
it is really not clear how the Tax Administration or Pension fund could
collect from farmers the contribution based on their income, because
the tax base is lacking. This shortcoming is further reinforced by the
fact that the calculation of cadastral income for income tax was also
quite outdated, since it was evaluated decades ago at the time of other
agricultural technologies and has never been re–calculated. Such a tax
basis did not have much to do with the actual situation and was, for
taxes, poor substitute for identification of real income. 
When the tax basis no longer exists and when it is not possible to de-
termine the real income of individual farm households by other good
techniques, it is necessary to choose a „handy“ solution. And so, in the
absence of a better one, this solution with the universal, equal – for –
all base for pension contribution was chosen. Such solution, regardless
of income or revenue, apparently indicates the kind of technical and
conceptual problems the farmers' pension insurance is facing.
8. Similarly, the decision on payment of contributions against the mini-
mum base has certain sense. That’s because large number of farmers
is not thrilled with the obligation to pay pension contributions while
the state has neither power nor the will to charge them by forced colle-
ction. Therefore, it is natural to establish a low base for mandatory con-
tributions, in the hope that it will be acceptable to a larger number of
the insured and that they will pay contributions. A higher base would
certainly reduce the number of payers.
9. Another provision of relevance for the insured farmers is the followi-
ng one: if the insured has not paid all due contributions, he/she will
have limited pension rights, and the Fund will suspend 1/3 of the estab-
lished monthly pension amount until the unpaid due contributions are
16
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settled. In this way, farmers have been given incentives in order for
them to acquire pension, despite the existence of the debt for unpaid
contributions, provided that the debt is later settled out of retirement.
This benefit was introduced so the insured farmers do not lose their
right to a pension due to the debts related to contributions. 
PENSION AMOUNT
10. Old age pensions are calculated in the same manner as other pen-
sions: personal points are calculated per year, realized from the contri-
butions during the pensionable service, and they are multiplied by the
value of a general point. Similarly, the pensionable service is added to
disability pensions, in order to increase the pensions of those who
have short pensionable service, and in the family ones adjustments
are made according to the number of household members, which is in
most cases reduced.
However, the mechanism for calculating old age and disability pen-
sions is virtually redundant for the farmers, since the calculations indi-
cate that on their paid minimal base they would receive pension that
is lower than the minimal one, and therefore the minimal pension is
applied. In fact, only with 40 years of pensionable service the insured
farmer would be entitled to old–age pension according to the said cal-
culation, which would be equal to the minimal pension. The reason is
evident: farmers pay pension contributions against the minimal base,
which is usually very low, so the calculated old age pension is very
low as well, especially for small number of years of service. 
11. So, for agricultural pensioners, and for the others as well, the mini-
mal („lowest“) pension is established, in relation to which the calculat-
ed one can not be lower. However, an unexpected difference occurs
between the farmers on one side and the employees and the self–em-
ployed on the other: their (farmers’) minimal pension is lower than in
the other two categories of pensioners. While in 2009 minimal pension
of the employees and the self–employed amounted to 11,088 RSD, for
farmers it was prescribed to be 8,385 RSD. This difference occurred in
2005, when the minimal pension of the two mentioned categories was
increased from 20 to 25% of average wage from the previous year, while
the old one was left for farmers. 
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It is difficult to find justification for this difference in the minimal wa-
ges. When the rules for retirement and method of pension calculation
are equal, there is no reason for the minimal pension to be different.
So, namely, two different categories of the insured obtain different min-
imal pensions although they are equal in everything else – equal con-
tribution payments, equal pensionable service, equal years of life. 
The author of these lines sees two possible political explanations:
• first, farmers are not organized into unions and associations and
their interests are therefore easy to ignore while the other two,
far better organized categories of the insured and pensioners,
strongly push their demands. Related to this, farmers spared a lot
this way, because virtually all retired farmers receive the minimal
pension, therefore the reductions cause substantial savings (abo-
ut 7 billion RSD per year);
• second, the legislator based its decision on average farmers’ small
number of years of pensionable service (due to irregular payme-
nts) compared to the other two categories of pensioners, so they
were „punished“ with lower minimal pension.
REGISTER RECORDS
12. In order for the pension system to function well, it requires consid-
erable amount of data. Therefore, the law stipulates the creation of
so–called Register records, which will include the required data. It is
managed by the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, with support
of other stakeholders and state institutions. 
Register records include data on three groups of stakeholders:
1. about the insured: personal data, insurance base and inception
date, pensionable service, wages and compensations, paid con-
tributions, contribution payer , etc.
2. about the pensioners: personal data, type of pension and legal
basis, the dates of attainment, inception of payment and pension
termination, base and type of disability, relationship and person-
al data for family pension, etc. and
3. about the contribution payers for pension and disability insur-
ance.
18
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Data is entered in the register records based on the application, both for
inception of the insurance and for any later updates. Different stake-
holders are required to submit applications, depending on the category
the insured belongs to: from the employer to the employment service. 
With farmers there was a serious question as to whom to entrust the
application job. One possibility was self–application, which implies in-
troduction of the obligation for the farmers to submit information about
themselves and their income, on their own. However, probably justi-
fied skepticism prevailed in relation to reliability of such records and
the possibility of subsequent control of hundreds of thousands of agri-
cultural households. 
13. For farmers, the following state institutions are obliged to submit
the application, according to the work allocation:
• Municipal administration, in the part related to the application
and cancellation of insurance and related personal changes and
• Tax Administration, in the part on the contribution base, their
payments by the insured and related financial data.
It is interesting to look at the genesis of the decisions on the municipal
administration bodies to be the source of basic and important data in
the register records. In the mid 1980s, at the time of preparation of
farmers’ pension insurance, a large activity related to autonomous reg-
istration of farmers was organized. They were given an important in-
centive in the form of free years of service for the pensionable period,
a maximum of ten years, depending on the age. About 450 thousand
farmers applied for pension insurance, out of estimated 850 thousand
potential policyholders. Since, according to these estimates, only half
of the population applied, additional activity was initiated, carried out
by the local authorities, primarily local community offices. That brou-
ght another 200 thousand policyholders, but also proved, it seemed,
that there is considerable potential in local authorities for collecting
data required for farmers’ pension insurance. 
Nevertheless, the system for self–application of the policyholders had
been used until 1992, i.e. they were required to report by themselves
any relevant change in their status of the insurance policy holders.
But, the deficiencies of this solution manifested very quickly, that is the
19
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lack of interest of the farmers to meet these formal obligations, and the
legislator sought other ways of updating register records. And so, in the
absence of alternative solutions, it relied on local government, i.e. on
municipal administration as a body that will supply the necessary in-
formation to the PDI Fund, for update of the Register records. 
Unfortunately, the municipal bodies do not pursue this statutory role
in the pension insurance of the farmers and do not submit the required
information to the PDI Fund. Therefore, the Fund is left completely
without legally required update of the data, i.e. without proper Register
records, with large and practically unsolvable problems. 
Another type of data in the Register records – the financial ones – is
stored at the Tax Administration and, as far as we know, there are no
major difficulties there.
FINANCING
14. Pension insurance in Serbia is financed by a combination of inco-
me from mandatory contributions and budget transfers. This also
applies to farmers' pensions. The role of other sources is negligible.
The pension contributions and their payment obligation were discu-
ssed previously. The Republic budget provides a financial contribution
based on two legal grounds. The first one is budget commitment to
fund the difference between the minimal pension set by law and the
amount of pension obtained by the application of general rules of pen-
sion calculation. In other words, when pensioners receive minimal
pensions instead of their lower pensions, the difference is required to
be covered by the budget of the Republic of Serbia. This difference is
standard for agricultural pensions.
The second ground for participation of the national budget in financing
of farmer pensions is general state guarantee for the functioning of the
pension system, which reads: „The Republic is the guarantor for the fund
obligations to exercise rights under the mandatory pension and dis-
ability insurance (state guarantee)“. Thus, the Republic of Serbia is ob-
liged to cover the shortage in the funding of pension system, when its
own revenues are not sufficient. This commitment is associated with
the right of the Republic to conduct contribution policy, and to pre-
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scribe lower contributions than required in case of balanced revenues
and expenditures of the pension system, which actually happened in
the last decade. 
ORGANIZATION
15. Farmers’ pension insurance was organized, since its creation, as a
separate pension fund, independent from the other two (of the employ-
ees and the self–employed). It had its Management board and direc-
tors, its account and financial independence. The Self – employed
Fund performed, for compensation, administrative duties for the Far-
mers’ Pension Insurance Fund.
However, from January 1st 2008, an administratively unique Pension
and Disability Insurance Fund functions, and it includes the three pre-
viously existing funds. During the three year transitional period, there
were three financial sub–accounts, but from 1 January 2011, this last
feature of autonomy will disappear and the Fund will use a single
account. Still, it will be possible to implement analytical monitoring of
financial and other flows in farmers' pension insurance.
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16. In this section, we will try to present the main features of the exist-
ing pension insurance of farmers and causes of such state of affairs. We
shall firstly give a few demographic data from the 2002 Census for
Serbia without Kosovo and Metohija:
Previous data can be taken for the analysis of farmers’ pension insura-
nce only as a rough estimate, as a framework, because their definitions
are not identical with the definitions in the law on pension insurance.
We should not forget the fact that this law defines farmers as all those
over the age of 15 who are members of the agricultural and mixed hou-
seholds, and are not included in the pension insurance of employees
or self–employed, are not retired and are not at school, with only one
member with compulsory insurance.
THE INSURED
17. Since the pension insurance in Serbia is based on pay–as–you–go
system, i.e. the funding of current expenditure on pensions is based on
the current income from pension contributions, the ratio of the num-
ber of the insured to the number of pensioners is very important for
the financial health of the pension system (and also of the farmers' pen-
sion fund, while there was one). The lower the ratio, the more difficult
it is to finance pensions. Thus the number of the insured in the pen-
sion system, as well as in its subsystems, plays a significant, almost
decisive role.
Table 1. Agricultural households and 
population, 2002, in 000
Number of agricultural households 778,9
Living on farms, total 2536,4
 Individual farmers 454,7
 Active outside the households 705,1
 With their own income (pension etc.) 526,2
 Dependant on someone else's support 845,2
Total agricultural population 817,1
 Active 529,2
 Individual farmers 487,7
 Dependant on someone else's support 287,8
Source: Census 2002.
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From this table we see that the number of insured farmers is quickly
decreasing – by as much as two–thirds since the creation of farmers’
pension insurance until today, i.e. in a just bit more than two decades.
This tendency gives a negative image of pension insurance of farmers:
while the number of pensioners is growing (more below), the number
of the insured is decreasing . This has now reached an extremely unfa-
vorable ratio of 1:1, since the number of retired farmers in late 2009 was
224.9 thousand, and the number of insured only 233.4 thousand. With
such ratio, where one insured person is to provide pension to one pen-
sioner, the pension fund must be in great financial crisis.
However, this very low number of the insured according to the Record
registers was significantly higher than the actual number of the insured
and is a consequence of the overestimation or incorrectness of the Regi-
ster records. The records show many farmers as the insured although
they are not so any more, due to insufficient updating of the Register. 
18. The exact number of actual, active far-
mers insured is not known, because of the
weaknesses in the records, which will be
more discussed further on. Rough estimate
of contribution revenues gives disappoint-
ing results. Namely, if the total annual con-
tribution revenues are divided by the amo-
unt of (equal for all) annual commitments
against the lowest base, the following num-
bers are arrived at: 
In other words, the revenue collected from
the insured farmers’ pension contribution
Table 3. Number of „full“
insured with contribution
paid
year number
2005 72.101
2006 73.162
2007 58.686
2008 42.861
2009 51.530
Source: Personal calculation based
on the data on the PDI Fund 
revenues
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Table 2. Number of insured farmers
Total Farmers
Members of agricul-
tural households
Members of mixed
households
1987 641503
1995 623403
2000 461904
31.12.2006. 332536 66141 160370 106025
31.12.2007. 314928 62891 152629 99408
March 2009. 233385
April 2009. 229118
Source: Records of the PDI Fund in Serbia
has in previous years been equal to the annual pension contribution
obligations of the number of insured given in the previous table. We
thus see that in the period 2007–2009 only about 50 thousand of the
insured paid the full annual obligation for pension contributions and
that the number is visibly reduced compared to previous years, when
it was just over 70 thousand.
Anyhow, the trend of the collection of farmers pension contributions at
constant prices is shown in the following chart:
There is an obvious downward collection trend – less and less collec-
tion in real terms from year to year, which testifies to the declining in-
terest of farmers for pension insurance, despite the conditions of state
subsidies for agriculture by participation in pension insurance and
payment of contributions.
The collection is low and it shows in the data on the ratio of actual col-
lection to collection task in an average year: In 2005. – the assessed
contribution for the insured was 6.93 bilion and collection was at only
1.75 billion dinars, i.e. only one quarter. 
19. The number of the active insured could still be greater than in the
previous table. As:
1. Not all the insured paid the entire annual obligation, but only
part of it, and remain in debt, but keep the actual status of the
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Chart 1. CONTRIBUTION PAID, constant prices
insured; so that (for the given total contributions revenue) there
is an appropriate increase of the number of those who have paid
something – be it the entire obligation, or only a part of it, and
2. some insured did not pay any contribution in a given year and
have not given up their pension insurance but are using the legal
possibility of so–called stand–by mode of pensionable service,
i.e. not to pay contributions for a certain year, and continue to
remain active insured and to be able to pay the contribution next
year, and such.
For the reasons mentioned, the number of the insured is higher than
the mentioned 50 thousand. We do not know how much higher, but it
is probable that the total number of active and „semi–active“ insured
is not likely above 100 thousand. The remainder of the total number
from the Register records are „dead souls“ – those in it only due to lack
of updatedness. 
Table no. 2 gives an important piece of data on the number of farmers
(i.e. the heads of households) that are insured. In 2006 and 2007 (we
have no data for other years)4 there were only 66.1 and 62.9 thousand
of them. According to census 2002, there were 454.7 thousand individ-
ual farmers (also heads of agricultural households), and this means
that the Register for those years held only every seventh farmer. Since,
we have seen, the nominal status in the Register is unreasonable and
excessive, and reduced in the last few years, it means that the number
of farmers (heads of household) is actually smaller. Generally, we
could assess that the farmers insurance includes roughly every eighth
to tenth farmer – head of household. 
These data and estimates indicate a big failure; one could say a fiasco
of the idea of compulsory pension insurance of farmers. This insur-
ance started off relatively well, with 640 thousand registered insured in
1987, while the state did a fairly good job on the inscription of the
insured, but also attracted farmers by granting them years of pension-
able service (up to 10 years). Later, however, when they were to move
from off and on (in spurts) to systematic work on updating the records,
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4 There are still separate Registers for farmers - for Vojvodina in Novi Sad, for central Serbia in Belgrade -
despite the fact that it has been 18 years since merging the two separate funds. Thus the provision of some
pieces of data for the entire Serbia is a special statistical task. 
the authorities completely failed and did not find a way to provide
updating of the Register records. And without it, one cannot success-
fully run a mandatory pension system.
20. The following table gives the results of a survey5 conducted in the
countryside in 2009 on the participation in pension insurance:
Evidently, among those who are active in agriculture only one quarter
pays pension and disability insurance, while over two fifths had previ-
ously made payments, but then stopped. As much as one third of farm-
ers had never been involved in the pension insurance.
The result of the survey that 22.3% of farmers pay pension insurance
seems excessive in light of the foregoing facts, and is probably the
result of inaccuracies in the survey as the source of information due to
the relaxed criteria of the interviewed about what it means to regular-
ly pay pension insurance. 
21. We have already seen that the local authorities (municipalities and
cities) are obliged by law to submit to the Fund notice of any change of
significance for the status of the insured, such as registration for insur-
ance and cancellation of insurance and related personal changes.
They, however, do not do that at all6, so that the PDI Fund is forced to
limit itself only to the changes reported to it by the insured themselves
due to their needs: be it cancellation of insurance (due to death, trans-
fer to another insurance etc.), be it registration (for acquiring the enti-
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5 The sample for the survey covered 1,621 households from rural Serbia.
6 „The system of submitting registrations for and cancellation of insurance for this category of the insured by
the municipal body does not function at all“, this is a statement from the Report on operation of the Republi-
can fund for pension and disability insurance for 2008.
Table 4. Payment of pension contribution
Employed in
the agriculture
Pay by themselves 22,3
Employer makes payments 2,1
Don't make payments but used to 43,4
Never have made payments 32,1
Total 100
Source: Social inclusion in the rural areas of Serbia, draft,
SeCons and UNDP, December 2009.
tlement to agricultural subsidies etc.)7. Of course, the number of the
insured is automatically decreased by the number of the farmers who
get retired during a year. All this, of course, is totally insufficient to
maintain the necessary databases on insured persons and their affairs,
since the Register records keep those who long ago cancelled the agri-
cultural pension insurance (transferred to employee insurance or
self–employed insurance) but did report it, then the deceased insured,
members of agricultural households who are no longer under the law
obligated to be insured but have not cancelled insurance, etc. 
There are weaknesses in the Tax Administration, as even it does not
submit to the PDI Fund all the information about the payment of con-
tributions, etc. The annual report of the PDI Fund mentions „non–per-
formance of the legally prescribed obligations by Tax Administration
(failure to submit M–4 forms for the self–employed insured and farm-
ers)“8. This in other words means that the PDI Fund does not know
who of the insured is paying contributions and who is not, it therefore
does not know who from the Register is really active and performs
their duties, and who has long ago stopped doing so. This problem was
created, or enhanced, since changing the law in 2003, when control
responsibility for payment of contributions was transferred from the
PDI Fund to the Tax Administration, which as we have seen, does not
do that regularly.
Such insufficiently updated Register records prevent any sensible ac-
tion of the PDI Fund and the Tax Administration towards collection of
due contributions or arrears, since they do not know which person is
insured and which is not, who could be covered by mandatory insur-
ance and who could not, who is of sufficient age to become insured
and who died long time ago. 
22. The other side of the inaccurate Register records and poor pay-
ment of contributions by the insured is the high debt of the insured to
the PDI Fund. Of course, a part of the debt is fictitious, because it
applies to persons who are not or are not intended to be insured. This
is what it looked like in 2005:
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7 The last „census“ of the insured was conducted in 1997, when the PDI Farmers Fund had the municipal
clerks implement it through service contract, but the result was not good. 
8 The Operations Report of the Republic Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance for 2008.
• Debt carried over from 2004 – RSD 7.71 billion,
• Contribution debited for 2005 – RSD 6.93 billion,
• Contribution collected for 2005 – RSD 1.75 billion,
• Balance of debt as at December 31, 2005 – RSD 12.92 billion9.
Since then to this day the debt has increased substantially, due to no
payment as well as due to debiting the amount of contribution for the
farmers who are no longer insured. Due to the latter (i.e. due to the
incorrect records) the amount of debt is not reliable, and it is not rele-
vant for the analysis.
23. Strong incentive to the expansion of the mandatory pension insur-
ance should be the linkage of insurance to the entitlement to apply for
state subsidies. Namely, the standard requirement of the Government
for a farmer to qualify for subsidy is the confirmation from the PDI
Fund on payment of contributions for pension insurance in that and
the previous year. This is an incentive for the farmers to participate in
the pension insurance, i.e. to pay the contributions. 
However, it seems incentive to insure by conditioning of agricultural
subsidies does not give the expected results. This can be seen from
quite a small total number of the insured who are paying contributions
or from modest total revenue from pension contributions of farmers
(Table 3). Such an outcome could be explained either by (1) the fact
that practically all active insured are exactly those applying for the
subsidy, so that others do not pay contributions, or by assuming (2)
confirmation of payment of pension contributions can somehow be
dodged, or bypassed, of which there are indications. Be that as it may,
despite a formal request for regular payment of contributions, the num-
ber of active insured is modest.
More generally speaking, there are reasons why the request for the reg-
ular payment of pension contributions to be eligible for subsidies can
hardly bring about a complete success. Let us mention three:
• a significant number of agricultural households is not interested
in state subsidies, due to weak human and material resources, in-
29
FARMERS' PENSION INSURANCE
________________________________
9 IInformation on the position of debt based on the unpaid pension insurance contributions of farmers and
measures for the increase of the rate of collection, Republic Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance of
Farmers, March 2006, pp 3-4
atractive subsidies, complicated procedures for the implementa-
tion of subsidies, small or unsuitable property and so on,
• some of the state subsidies are modest in value, so farmers do
not find it profitable to pay one year of pension contributions in
order to get a much smaller subsidy,
• complete and strict insistence on the aforementioned condition-
ing exercise questions the implementation of agricultural policy,
because, if some farms give up the subsidies because of the obli-
gation to pay pension contributions, there will be less interest in
the subsidies compared to potential unconditional funding, and
therefore only the Ministry of Agriculture would have a motive to
drop conditions; In other words, it is natural to see the conflict
between the goals of spreading the coverage of pension insurance
and strengthening of agricultural production, and it will not be sur-
prising if conditionality is aborted (at least partially); some subsidi-
es no longer requiring certificate of paid contributions: For exam-
ple, the premium for milk, production with higher added value and
to develop non–agricultural activities in the countryside for 2010.
24. There is another powerful incentive for the participation of farmers
in the pension insurance: a favorable ratio of paid contributions to pen-
sions, i.e. expense to income of farmers. In fact, farmer insurance solu-
tions in effect give a good financial calculation for farmers and allow them
a strategy of partial payment of contributions. This is what it is about:
1. In Serbia, the right to retire is attained at 40 years of pensionable
service (men) or at 65 years of age and at least 15 years of pen-
sionable service;
2. Farmers pay pension contribution against the minimum base,
which last year amounted to 35% of the average salary in Serbia,
3. There is minimum pension, which for farmers amounted to RSD
8,385 in 2009,
4. If the farmer pays contributions for 15 years, retires and receives
(minimum) pension, then they will receive a high subsidy (or
gift) from the Republic of Serbia equal to as much as 62.1% of the
pension.
Namely, by the implementation of general regulations on the calcula-
tion of pension, such a farmer would receive a pension which would
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amount to only RSD 3,17410, but the PDI Fund pays him a minimum of
RSD 8,385 per month. This is how the unearned transfer of RSD 5,211 a
month is realized, or 62.1% of the paid pension. This gift is paid by the
budget of the Republic of Serbia. Of course, with the increasing num-
ber of years of pension service that gift is decreasing and the farmers'
pension calculated according to the general regulations is equalized
with the minimum pension for 40 years of pensionable service, and
only then does the mentioned subsidy for male pensioners disappear. 
By way of this gift, the legislator has, by all means, given incentive for
the participation of farmers in the pension insurance: However, this
incentive is only for limited participation, i.e. for the optimization of
their position, which results in a strategy to achieve the minimum pen-
sionable service of 15 years. That is when, as we have seen, the finan-
cial calculation is the most favorable for the farmer. 
Indeed, the average retired farmer has only 16 years of pensionable
service (in 2009), which indicates that the optimization calculation
works perfectly, at least among those who calculate. (One part of the
pensioners has short pensionable service due to the recent date of the
introduction of the pension scheme and the gift in the years of service
awarded by the law at the time it was enacted.)
On the other hand, the mechanism has completely discouraged regu-
lar, decades–long farmers insurance, therefore only few reach 40 years
of pensionable service, which is common for men in the insurance of
the employed and the self–employed. This is also quite natural and
inevitable since the insured farmer does not receive anything by the
extension of pensionable service or additional contributions – his pen-
sion remains the same, the minimal one. 
Moreover, the aforementioned optimization calculations of the insured
farmers focused on achieving the minimum required pensionable ser-
vice (15 years) leads them to avoid payment of contributions for other
years of service, which is the cause of their large and uncollectible
„debt“, the existence of the institute of stand–by mode of service and
mode of payment of debts for pension contributions and other formal
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10 For 15 years of service a farmer acquires 5.25 points (15x0.35), which, multiplied by the value of a gen-
eral point in 2009 of RSD 604.51, equals the calculated pension of RSD 3,174.
and informal techniques to avoid payment of due contributions and
insurance. In other words, the decision on a favorable ratio of (mini-
mum) pension and contributions of farmers created a mechanism that
destroys pension system and reduces it to the struggle to avoid pen-
sionable service of over 15 years.
The question remains why all farmers do not use the entire above men-
tioned convenience and do not „earn“ on a solution offered by the law-
maker, but instead only some do so, so really only a part of farmers
participates in the pension insurance. We cannot offer empirical res-
ponse to this question, we can only speculate. One reason could be the
widespread ignorance about the costs and benefits of participation in
the pension system and the weakness of individuals’ calculations. Ano-
ther could be a widespread general mistrust of farmers in the pension
system, and in the long–term ability and willingness of the state to pro-
vide what is written in the Law. Experiences with pensions from the
previous period are not positive, which certainly used to increase
indifference of farmers to insurance. Moreover, almost all the time the-
re is the constantly hovering question „what is being done with farm-
ers' pension system“?, due to its poor performance, so that farmers feel
that the system is not essentially stable, that it is not certain it would
survive in the long run. Only a small step is needed from this concep-
tion to cancellation of insurance.
25. A strong impetus was given to the non–payment of contributions by
the great delinquency in the payment of pensions which was happen-
ing until recently and in 2005 even reached 20.5 monthly pensions. Cri-
ses of the previous years and the UN sanctions have brought great dif-
ficulties in payment of all pensions, but the political elite decided to
give priority to the payment of pensions of employees, while farmers'
pensions remained at the rear of priorities. Moreover, farmer pensions
were not only low and almost two years late, but were also inflation de-
preciated, which left the extremely unfavorable impression with the far-
mers: the last traces of confidence in the pension system disappeared,
with the conclusion that it can not be counted on as income in old age. 
In fact, a circulus vitiosus was established in the farmers' pension insu-
rance: weak payment of contributions led to difficulties in financing
and delayed payment of pensions, and this led to still weaker payment
of contributions and so on. Unfavorable balance was interrupted only
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by turning the delinquent pensions into public debt and their payment
together with the relevant interest rate in the period 2007–2010. Howe-
ver, lost confidence did not return immediately with the normalization
of pension financing, and the adverse consequences of the crisis years
of farmers pension insurance are still clearly felt. In other words, the
distrust of farmers in the state insurance remains strong.
26. The other element that reduces the attractiveness of this insurance
is low pensions, i.e. the inability of farmers to achieve a more than min-
imal pension. Because the unique minimum base for the payment of
contributions for all insured leads to low pensions calculated, and it in
turn leads to the payment of the statutory minimum pension practical-
ly for all farmers. It is, however, quite low (just over 8 thousand dinars,
or 80 Euros), which might be interesting for poor elderly households,
but not to better off, mixed households, which also have younger acti-
ve members. For them, this pension is unattractive and therefore they
do not wish to participate in the pension insurance.
On the other hand, the base for the insurance is too high for many indi-
gent households (approximately 450 Euros per year for an individual),
which is discouraging for their participation in insurance. So this con-
firms that the single uniform base is inadequate for rural areas becom-
ing more stratified: for some it is too low (due to low pension), for some
it is too high.
27. The following discouraging mechanism is currently at work: base
for the payment of contributions is regularly increased in line with the
Law, i.e. it follows the growth of nominal wages in Serbia, which exists
despite the crisis, while, on the other hand, pensions remain frozen in
nominal amount for over a year and a half. In other words, the farmer
sees the state asking for more and more through contributions and giv-
ing back a constant amount through frozen pensions. That cannot im-
prove the credibility of the pension system in the eyes of farmers.
28. The functioning of the farmers’ pension system depends also on
the attitude of the state, and on its willingness and determination to im-
plement the Law as laid down. If the state is „soft“ or if it is not able to
provide (and enforce) implementation of insurance, then the compul-
sory insurance can be converted to voluntary, where it is up to the in-
sured themselves whether and to what extent will they be included in
insurance.
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The willingness of the state certainly exists in the insurance of emplo-
yed and self–employed, despite some difficulties, so that in these two
segments it is obvious to the insured that pension insurance is manda-
tory. On the other hand, farmers do not have that feeling, because the
state does nothing, or barely anything at all, on the provision of com-
pulsory pension insurance, in accordance with the law: there are no
penalties for failure to pay contributions, there is no forced collection
of contributions, incentives are often awarded to somehow cover
non–payment or insufficient payment of contributions (stand–by mode
of service, payment of debts out of pension) and such. Simply, no far-
mer felt any compulsion or heard that someone else felt the firm hand
of the state, and it is no wonder that they all behave as if the farmers'
pension system is voluntary. And it is really voluntary. The only one
who is really insured is the one who wants to be and pays as much as
and when he wants. So this is a voluntary insurance, and more so than
many of nominally voluntary insurance schemes.
The question remains whether the state, even if it had wanted to, wou-
ld have been able to provide mandatory insurance given the weakness
of Register records and the problems that causes. The response is: yes,
it could have. Because, firstly, it has allowed accumulation of the incon-
sistencies in the Register records, i.e. has not found a way to maintain
a correct and relatively accurate list of the insured. It has not created
the Register of the citizens of Serbia, has not used the Register for the
health insured for the needs of the pension scheme, it has not created
the Central Register of the Insured through Social Security scheme
(now this task is very slowly moving ahead) etc. 
Secondly, even the existing Register records give possibility of coerci-
on: for example, if the insured farmer pays a contribution for one year,
and does not report that he cancelled the insurance for the following
year, Tax Authorities could use coercive measures against him. And
thirdly, the state has demonstrated clear lack of desire to collect tax on
agriculture income from farmers, which is a more serious liability from
the standpoint of the state. The tax is kept very low (for two decades
there has been no adjustment of liabilities in dinars, despite high infla-
tion) and then its collection was suspended for reasons of greater
administrative costs than revenue. If the state intended to burden farm-
ers by tax, it could either adjust obligation under the cadastral income
or replace this tax with another. In this way it is giving tax amnesty to
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a class of taxpayers, which of course inevitably means that it is „soft“
with the pension contributions as well. Of course, for us here it is not
necessary to consider the deeper social and political causes of such
strategy in the relationship of the state and the farmers – it is sufficient
just to make note of the state of affairs.
29. Gordana Matkovic, the Minister of Social Affairs, was the one who
had the only serious plan for the recovery of farmers’ pension insur-
ance and who tried to implement it back in 2003. In fact, this system
was then faced with the same serious problems: non–payment of con-
tributions and big debts on this basis, messy Register records, etc. Her
plan was as follows:
1. to reduce the accumulated debt with the help of a new concept
called stand–by pensionable service, i.e. to write off a substantial
part of the debt without pension rights for the write–off years,
which was legitimized by a new law on pension insurance in 2003
enabling the stand–by service of five years,
2. to reduce the future contributions burden of agricultural house-
holds, by replacing insurance obligation for all household mem-
bers by a single member obligation, while others can choose
whether or not to be insured, which is also legitimized by new
law on pension insurance in 2003,
3. to fix Register records through the creation of the Central Register
of the insured, which was started by providing World Bank loan for
the job, but the Central Register was legalized just this month (May
2010), which means the matter had been protracted for six years,
4. to take stricter attitude to the default contributions, that is to
apply all the techniques of collection that are prescribed by law
and to apply them to employees and the self–employed (credible
threat of forced collection, etc.).
However, the government that started the implementation of this plan
was dissolved in late 2003 and replaced by the new post–election one,
which did not proceed to implement it. 
Let's look at some of the important applications significant for insur-
ance submitted between April 10, 2003 (when the new law on pension
insurance came into force) and December 21, 2006, which changed
many of the insured status:
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As can be seen, the insurance for about 40 thousand insured was can-
celed due to changes in regulations, which left an insurance obligation
for only one member of agricultural households. It is a modest number
that testifies more to the failure to report changes than to the desire for
all household members to remain insured.
The number of applications for stand–by of pension insurance is con-
siderable – about 100 thousand – and indicates the applicant wish to
postpone solving the problem of the accumulated debt to the pension
fund, or debt based on unpaid contributions. 
This, in other words, shows the desire of farmers to preserve acquired
rights from pension insurance and keep the insurance until further
notice without cost, and without paying long overdue obligations ba-
sed on pension contributions. What happens next remains to be seen.
PENSIONERS
30. Mandatory pension insurance of farmers was founded in 1986, and
only fourteen years later, the number of pensioners already reached
over 200 thousand:
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Table 5. Application for changes in insurance
Reason for application Number, u 000
Termination of insurance (reduction of obligation to only one member) 40,7
Stand-by of pensionable service (Art. 219) 59,7
Stand-by of pensionable service (Art. 14) 39,7
Source: Operations report for 2007, Republic Farmers PDI Fund
Such an explosive jump of the number of pensioners in a relatively
short period is a consequence of the two legal solutions: 
1. small number of years of service required for the realization of
old age pension (15 years) and
2. awarding a gift of one to ten years of pensionable service to the
first generation of pensioners under the law, and without pay-
ment of contributions.
During the last decade the number of retirees is moving far more mod-
erately:
The rate of increase in the number of pensioners amounted to only
1.7% in the period 2000–2006. Since then, the number of farmer pensio-
ners has been in stagnation essentially11, which most probably means
that the maximum in the number of pensioners has been reached. As
the number of the insured has been decreasing all the time, it is inevi-
table after a period of maturing of the pension system for it to reach the
maximum number of pensioners and then for the number to begins to
decrease. 
31. The movement of pensioners over the last two years is shown in
the following table:
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11 Small decrease in the number of pensioners in 2008 is the consequence of the administrative difficulties of
merging the three funds into one and the resulting delay in the administration of retirement claims.
By all accounts, these data indicate the beginning of the process of re-
ducing the number of retired farmers. Let us take a closer look. During
the last two years the trend of the number of new members is not rep-
resentative, since the pooling of funds brought about the mentioned
administrative difficulties. Thus, the total number of new pensioners in
2009 is three times higher than in 2008, which can be interpreted by
certain delays in rendering decisions on retirement in 2008 and in re-
solving the stalemate in 2009 (together with regular processing of cur-
rent requests). Thus 2008 is lower than it should be and 2009 is higher.
On the other hand, the number of deceased pensioners is similar in
both years. The total result is that in 2008 the number of farmers pen-
sioners was reduced by 5.6 thousand and in 2009 increased by 2.9
thousand. If it is assumed that the aforementioned slowdown from 2008
was made up for in 2009, which is realistic, then the sum of the changes
for the two years would give a more realistic picture of the number of
farmers retired: it is decreased by 2.7 thousand. 
32. The structure of the farmers’ pensions is shown in the following ta-
ble, along with the structure of the employees and of the self–emplo-
yed for the comparing purposes:
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Table 6. Changes in the number of pensioners, 2008 and 2009
2008 2009
Old-age new beneficiaries 2700 10387
deceased 8269 9096
Disability new beneficiaries 553 1188
deceased 489 583
Survivor new beneficiaries 1422 2632
deceased 1515 1596
Total new beneficiaries 4675 14207
deceased 10273 11275
Total change –5598 2932
Source: Records of the PDI Fund in Serbia
Table 7. Share in the total volume of pensions, 2009, in %
Old-age Disability Survivor
Employees 51,5 24,9 23,6
Self-employed 44,0 29,8 26,2
Farmers 83,4 5,6 11,0
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
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The share of the old–age pensions in the total number of farmers' pen-
sions is very high and in 2009 was 83.4%. That percentage used to be
even higher, but was reduced due to increased share of disability and
survivor pensions during the last decade. 
These data show that there are not many disability pensioners among
the famers– only one in twenty. It is possible that part of the cause may
be the physical activity of the famers in the fresh air, which preserves
the health, but it is also likely that the famers are less skilled in using
all the possibilities offered for obtaining the disability pensions. The
share of the disability pensioners in the total number of pensioners
among the employees and the self–employed is 5 to 6 times higher.
Even the share of survivor pensions in the total number of famers’ pen-
sions is lower than with employees and the self–employed by more
than one half. This is the consequence of two reasons: (1) due to short
period of usage of this type of insurance, among the pensioners there
is still majority which belongs to the first generation of pensioners, so
the number of survivor pensions is still low and (2) since until recent-
ly all members of the household were insured under mandatory insur-
ance, many women have become entitled to pensions, and there was
no need for them to shift to survivor pension upon the potential death
of their husbands in the same amount. 
33. It is interesting to take a look at the gender structure of the farmers
pensioners: in 2008 the share of women was 62.5%, and of men it was
only 37.5%! More women among the pensioners is in accordance with
more women among the insured, in the official register: In the end of
2006, for example, there were 174.8 thousand women and 157.8 thou-
sand insured men. 
We also have thorough data on
gender structure for old–age and
disability pensions in 2009:
Women are very dominant amo-
ng the old–age pensioners – they
make as much as 63.1% of the
total number. With the disability pensioners there is a relative balance,
men make a little bit above one half of pensioners (52.8%). Undoubte-
dly, women prevail within survivor pensions beneficiaries.
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Table 8. Gender structure, December
2009, in %
Old-age Disability
women 118145 5926
men 69107 6620
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
One can only guess what the reason for this domination of women may
be. The author believes that the main reason is the fact that men are
those who are usually employed and in that way they ensure addition-
al income later, via insurance of the employed, and they obtain higher
pension than they would have as farmers, while women predominant-
ly keep the status of farmers and assisting members of the household,
obtaining low pension, which provide certain basic safety and regular
income, which covers basic needs in a household such as electricity,
coffee, sugar. In other words, the pension of a woman is understood as
a last solution for old–age insurance, if everything else fails.
34. The following table shows the age structure of the old–age pensioners:
The cohorts aging from 65 to 80 are predominant. It is expected, since,
on one hand, it is in accordance with the terms of retiring of men
(women have larger share of cohorts of 61–65 years of age due to more
favorable conditions, i.e. earlier
retiring), and on the other hand,
due to biological reasons of gen-
erations over 80. 
The table 10 shows the average
age of pensioners from all the
three subsystems of the pensi-
on insurance:
40
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Table 10. The average age of old-age
pensioners, 2008
Old age pensions
men women
Farmers 74 70
Employees 70 65
Self-employed 70 62
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
Table 9. Age structure of the old-age
pensioners, December 2008, in %
Total Women Men
51–55 0,1 0,1 0,0
56–60 2,6 4,1 0,1
61–65 11,0 14,7 4,7
66–70 25,3 27,8 21,2
71–75 34,6 36,6 31,4
76–80 22,1 15,9 32,5
81–85 3,9 0,8 9,0
86–90 0,5 0,1 1,1
90+ 0,1 0,0 0,1
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
The average age of a famer pensioner is high: 74 years of age of men
and 70 of women. It is significantly higher than among the pensioners
belonging to the other two subsystems. There are two reasons for high-
er average age of the famers pensioners: (1) almost all pensioners are
retired on the basis of their age, while with the other two types of insur-
ance younger people may be retired too on the basis of the years of
service (including the accelerated service) and (2) inflow of the new
generations of pensioners has been slowed down recently, thus the
average age increases gradually. 
We will take a look at the age of pensioners, but only of those who we-
re retired in the last year we have the data for (2008).
Naturally, the average age of the
new farmers pensioners is lower
than with all the current pensio-
ners. With farmers, the average
age here is also visibly higher
than with the other two pensio-
ners’ categories, due to mentio-
ned reasons.
The data on age show that farmers' pensions are more effective in rea-
ching the essential purpose of the pension insurance than it is the case
with the other two pension insurance subsystems: insurance of inco-
me in the old age. Farmers get retired only when they grow old and as
pensioners they are, on average, older than others.
35. The number of the years of
service is particularly important
for the pension system, since
that is the indicator of how much
they contributed to the pension
insurance during the time they
were employed.
An average farmer pensioner, re-
gardless of whether we speak
about women or men, has only 16 years of service. It results from dif-
ferent facts:
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Table 11. The average age of the new
old-age pensioners, 2008
Old age pensions
men women
Farmers 64 60
Employees 60 57
Self-employed 62 57
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
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Table 12. The average number 
of the years of service of the old-age
pensioners; Dec 2008
Old age pensions
men women
Farmers 16 16
Employees 36 31
Self-employed 32 29
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
• when the scheme was established, years of service were granted,
so even those without 15 years of service were entitled to pension,
• the pension scheme is relatively new, i.e. many people did have
possibilities to acquire more years of service before they rea-
ched certain age adequate for retiring 
• the payment of contributions was avoided and the government
accepted such practice in various ways (suspended years of ser-
vice, payment of debts from pensions, etc).
Anyway, this average of 16 years is less than half of the years of serv-
ice required for women, not to mention the number of years required
for men. It is far too little in comparison with both the pensioners com-
ing from the insurance of the employed and the self–employed, who
almost have double the years of service. 
This result clearly indicates one important reason for the deep crisis of
the pension insurance of farmers: not only that the insured pay very
modest contributions a year, which was discussed earlier, but the con-
tributions are paid for the small number of years, which not only caus-
es financial difficulties for the insurance system, but also deprives the
pension insurance concept of the logic altogether. The logic of the pen-
sion insurance requires an active insured person to work and make
contributions for over 35 or 40 years, which can be less in exceptional
cases only: disability, personal issues related to interrupted insurance,
etc. The insurance may not be based on so small number of years with
so low contributions paid by so small number of the insured, as it is
the case now in the pension insurance of farmers.
The similar case is with disability pensions:
The average period of service of
the disability pensioners is sig-
nificantly shorter than the peri-
od of service of the employed
and the self–employed. To some
extent, it is normal, bearing in
mind the short service period of
farmers pensioners, and of the
active insured farmers. If an
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Table 13. The average number 
of the years of service of the disability
pensioners, Dec 2008
Old age pensions
men women
Farmers 15 14
Employees 26 23
Self-employed 24 20
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
average insured farmer has relatively few years of service, it is then
natural that the insured entitled to the disability pension should have
few years of service.
36. The following table shows the data on average number of years of
service of the new pensioners, i.e. those who retired during 2008.
New users of old–age pensions
among famers have, on average,
20 and/or 21 years of service. It
is a tangible improvement when
compared to the average num-
ber of years of all farmers pen-
sioners (16 years) and is also an
improvement related to some
earlier very liberal solutions
(granting the years of service, etc). However, the average value is still
significantly below the value of pensioners coming from the sector of
the employed and the self–employed, who, on average, have more than
30 years of service, both women and men. 
PENSIONS
37. The farmers’ pensions are generally low
and in the previous period were not paid re-
gularly. The (ir)regularity of payments is
shown in the following table:
The table shows that the main delays were
recorded in the second half of the '90s, whi-
ch is quite unusual. The most severe crisis
due to UN sanctions occurred in the first
half of the '90s, and the crisis relaxed signif-
icantly upon the signing of the Dayton Tre-
aty in 1995. Even the first sale of Telekom in
1997, which brought general relaxation in
the country in that year, did not bring any-
thing for the farmers pensioners: they were
paid only 6 pensions.
Table 15. The number of
paid pensions per year
1995 12
1996 10
1997 6
1998 8
1999 5
2000 10
2001 19
2002 12,5
2003 7
2004 12
2005 11,5
2006 12
2007 12
2008 12
2009 12
Source: Records of the PDI fund
in Serbia
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Table 14. The average period of service
of the new old-age pensioners, 2008
Old age pensions
men women
Farmers 21 20
Employees 37 31
Self-employed 35 31
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
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After 2000, the situation improved: pensioners are usually paid 12 pen-
sions per year, especially in the last few years. In 2001 they were paid
19 pensions in order to cover the delay, while in 2003, the year of the
wide reform of the pension system and its subsystems, they were paid
7 pensions only. 
38. During the last few years, trends related to the average pension of
farmers looked like this:
We can identify three leaps: (1) extraordinary increase of pensions in
January 2008 by 11.06%, (2) regular increase on the basis of the indexa-
tion in March 2008 by 6.97% and (3) combined regular increase on the
basis of indexation by 4.13% and extraordinary increase by 10% in Oc-
tober 2008. After that, the pensions were frozen at nominal amounts
upon the economic crisis break–out and reached agreement with the IMF. 
Before the pensions were frozen, the following mechanism for indexa-
tion was applied: The pensions were adjusted twice a year, in April and
October, according to the formula which involved the trends related to
prices and salaries/wages. The formula was changed in the following
situations: while in 2001 the formula established as „Swiss formula“, in
which weights of prices and salaries/wages were equal (50% each),
later the weight of the salaries/wages was decreased only to be exclud-
ed from the formula in the end, so the indexation mechanism con-
tained only prices, i.e. costs of living. 
44
FUNCTIONING AND PROBLEMS
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
di
na
rs
7500
8000
8500
20
07
20
07
20
07
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
08
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
20
09
10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
nominal
real
Chart 4. AVERAGE FARMERS’ PENSION
Source: Calculated on the basis of the documentation of the PDI fund
and the statis-tics of prices of the RS Statistical Office.
The nominal trends of pensions do not equal the real trends, as there
is a permanent inflation. From the previous graph we can see that the
growth of the real pension of farmers (lower line) existed until the
October 2008, and that afterwards the average pension decreased due
to combination of the nominal freezing the pensions and inflations,
although the decrease was gradually slow. 
39. The long–term graph of trends related to the real value of the farm-
ers pensioners follows:
As the graph shows, the average pension was dropping until the begin-
ning of this decade, as a consequence of the deep crisis, financial diffi-
culties and existing indexation mechanism. Since the beginning of this
decade, the average pension increased rapidly as a result of the inde-
xation mechanism which was si-
gnificantly relying on the trends
in salaries/wages, and they grew
rapidly during several years. 
However, the rapid growth in the
long–term did not lead to signifi-
cant increase in the average pen-
sion, due to very low values in the
past. The following table proves
that the pensions of farmers are
still low:
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Chart 5. AVERAGE FARMERS’ PENZION, constant price
Table 16. The average pension of
farmers compared to the pensions of
the employed and the self-employed,
in %
Farmers/
employed
Farmers/ 
self-employed
2001 9,9 10,0
2003 28,4 29,0
2006 37,4 38,5
2009 37,5 38,3
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
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The average pension of farmers was only one tenth of the average pen-
sion of the employed and the self–employed at the beginning of the
previous decade! And the latter ones were not high, on the contrary.
Over the following years, and after the regulations on minimum pen-
sion were amended, that ratio improved a little and the average farmer
pension reached around 38% of the average pension from the other
two types of insurance. It has remained on that level to date.
40. The importance of the legal
provision on minimum pension is
indicated by the domination of exa-
ctly that minimum pension amo-
ng the farmers:
The minimum pension is paid to
183.5 thousand farmers pension-
ers, i.e. as much as 81.7% of the
total number. It is the result of the
above described mechanism: the
basis on which the contributions
are paid is low, and pensioners on average have very short period of ser-
vice, so these two factors result in the pension lower than minimum pen-
sion, and thus the majority of pensioners are paid the minimum pensions. 
Pensions lower than minimum are paid to survivors as these pensions
are not subject to general minimum pension provision, while only one
in ten pensioners is paid the pension which is above the minimum level. 
41. Let’s have a look at the ratio between the average pensions in cer-
tain categories of the farmers–pensioners:
The old–age pensions are just a little higher than the average farmer
pensions, while the disability pensions are higher than the old–age
pensions. The survivors pensions are lagging behind and they are only
46
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Table 18. The ratio among the three pension categories
Total Old-age Disability Survivor
2001 100 101,9 108,5 75,2
2005 100 102,5 107,8 74,1
2009 100 102,7 109,1 75,3
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
Table 17. Pension distribution,
January 2010
Pension amount number in %
up to 6000 26929 12,0
up to 8384 3628 1,6
minimum 8385 183548 81,7
up to 10681 7144 3,2
overa 10682 3516 1,6
Total 197836 100
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
three quarters of the general average pensions. The ratios between the
categories of pensions are stable and have not changed for a long peri-
od of time.
OTHER BENEFITS
42. The pension and disability insurance involves, apart from pensions,
other benefits too, such as allowance for home health aides and alowan-
ce for bodily damages, and funeral costs. Let’s look at the basic figures:
The insured or the beneficiary who needs the assistance and care of
an aide due to nature and complexity of his/her injuries or sickness is
entitled to use the allowance for home health aide. The level of this
allowance is indexed in the same way as pensions.
During the lat few years, there has been a trend of increasing number
of beneficiaries of home health aides among the farmers pensioners.
The reason for that may be lying in the fact that this benefit is actually
double higher than the average farmer pension and thus very attractive.
The reason may also be that the farmers have become more informed
on various possibilities the pension and disability insurance provides.
43. The allowance for bodily damage is intended for the cases of redu-
ced functionality of organs or parts of the body, which makes the nor-
mal activity difficult and requires significant effort in meeting the life
needs, regardless of the fact such state results in the disability or not.
It may occur in the job or outside the job, and it may be paid to those
who already receive pensions or not.
FINANCING
44. The most serious issue related to the pension insurance of farmers
is of financial nature: as early as in the mid 90's, the revenues did not
47
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Table 19. Other benefits, December 2009
Number of 
beneficiaries
Amount of
dinars
Home health aides 10132 13321
Allowance for bodily damages 1547 606–5598 
Source: Records of the PDI fund in Serbia
match the expenditures and the growing deficit appeared. Since the
system is based on the pay–as–you–go principle, any deficit in income
has to reflect in the financial results of the insurance.
Let’s look the trends in the total expenditures (pensions, other social
benefits and (small) administrative expenses) and revenues originat-
ing from the contributions and the budget, expressed in constant pri-
ces in 2009 in order to avoid the effect of the inflation:
While the revenues from pension contributions practically have stag-
nated or mildly dropped in the last decade, the expenditures have gro-
wn constantly in the same period. The growth is the result of the incre-
ase in the number of pensioners and of the real pension growth from
2001 onwards. The difference between these two items is a deficit of the
pension insurance of farmers which has to be financed by the budget
of Serbia. 
The share of the pension contributions in financing the expenditures
of pension and disability insurance of farmers has been decreasing,
and in 2009 it was only 8.5%, while the budget of Serbia has to provide
the rest, more than 90% of the necessary funds. Such situation com-
pletely undermines the basic concept of the PAYG system, which is to
cover the current expenditures with the current revenues from contri-
butions, i.e. financing the pensions by active employees. It would be
also in accordance with the concept if the budget temporarily or in
small amounts covered the financing of the pensions, but not if the
48
FUNCTIONING AND PROBLEMS
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
total expenditures
from the budget
from contributions
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Chart 6. EXPENDITURES AND INCOMES, 
constant prices
budget took over the whole burden. In that case, it is some other sys-
tem.
45. The current system, if we can call it a system at all, resembles the
model of social pensions, but only partially. Namely,
• it resembles the system of social pensions because it is financed
from the budget, i.e. by all the tax payers regardless of whether they
will be entitled to receive these or some other type of pensions,
• it differs from the model of social pensions since it does not mean
that everybody is entitled to pensions– not all the population, not
all the farmers; in order to be entitled to these pensions, it is nec-
essary to be a farmer and to pay the entrance ticket, i.e. to pay
some contributions for some time, but in the amount significant-
ly lower than the expected amount of the pension.
SUMMARY
1. In the mid 80’s, Serbia established mandatory pension insurance
for farmers,
2. the state had, and still has the poor enforcement policy towards
the farmers and thus avoids enforced collection of contributions,
turning the mandatory insurance into voluntary,
3. not more than 100 thousand farmers can be considered the active
insured,
4. the main register of the active contributors is not updated, since
the state bodies which are in charge for updating it according to
the law (municipal administration bodies) do not do their job at
all, and they are not under pressure of the central government to
do it,
5. the farmers are mostly not interested in pension insurance and
they avoid participation and payments of pension contributions,
primarily due to lack of confidence in the solidity of the system,
6. very soon, after 15 years, the number of pensioners reached 200
thousand, due to liberal solutions from the time of the system
establishment,
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7. the number of pensioners is probably at maximum now, since
the demographic processes and decreased number of the insu-
red will result in the reduced number of pensioners in the future,
8. the average years of service for farmers is very low, which indi-
cates that their contributions to the system were very low,
9. the pensions are low and unattractive for many, 
10.the farmers pensioners receive huge transfers via minimum pen-
sions, which are almost always higher than those calculated
according to the law,
11.as early as 10 years after the establishment, the insurance system
faced a financial crisis; at the end of the 90’s the deficit was com-
pensated by delayed payments, and during the previous years by
increased transfers from the budget of the Republic.
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POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THE FARMERS’
PENSION INSURANCE
46. In the second part of this paper we will consider the main options for
dealing with the farmers’ pension insurance crisis. We will not deal with
the small changes in the existing model, but with the most important
issues, in order to point out the crucial dilemmas to the decision makers.
We believe that there are three main options:
• radical rehabilitation of the farmers' pension insurance,
• extension of the existing situation and
• cancellation of mandatory insurance of farmers.
We have to emphasize immediately that the political circumstances
will primarily affect the choice of options, not the technical or concep-
tual side of issues. Since, the existing difficulties, i.e. the profound cri-
sis of this segment of the pension insurance is primarily the result of
the governmental activities, which organizes and manages this type of
insurance very poorly due to its own weakness and political influen-
ces. Therefore, the subsequent dynamics of farmers’ pension insura-
nce shall depend primarily on political considerations, and afterwards
on other issues – technical, human, financial... That is why the primary
remedy for the crisis of the farmers’ insurance must be sought in the
political sphere, i.e. in the change of its relation towards the farmers’
insurance. 
Radical regulation of the system requires considerable political energy,
namely a substantial investment of effort in renovating the complex ad-
ministrative structure, on one hand, and change in the attitudes towa-
rds non–enforcement of farmers’ obligations, i.e. implementation of the
administrative repression when necessary, on the other hand.
Extension of the current situation is probably the easiest option from
the standpoint of political factors. Since, in that case, no radical decisi-
ons should be made, and therefore there is no danger of losing politi-
cal ratings of the ruling coalition.
Even the cancellation of mandatory farmers’ insurance would not have
any direct effect on anyone, since it is only formally required and be-
cause the farmers are not particularly interested in it, but the ruling
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political parties would face certain political disadvantages due to can-
cellation of a social institution that is usually considered progressive
and necessary in the modern world (even if it is not true).
OPTION 1: UPGRADING OF THE EXISTING MODEL
47. Structural and functional weaknesses of the existing system of farm-
ers’ pension insurance are numerous and deep, and thus the status of
the system is extremely unfavorable: it does not provide a quiet old age
to agricultural pensioners, and it costs very much. 
As we have seen, serious gaps exist in conceptual sense and, even more,
in the operation and implementation. Therefore, the improvement and
revitalization of this segment of the pension insurance would require
considerable work. The essential problem is the performed fundamen-
tal transformation of mandatory into voluntary pension insurance,
with all the associated consequences of poor coverage, the poverty of
the old farmers and budget efforts, wherefrom the imperative need for
providing mandatory farmers’ pension insurance supervenes.
Radical reform of the agricultural insurance would include changing
several constructive elements, but there are two basic and necessary
changes:
1. creating and maintaining accurate register records of the insured
farmers, with all the relevant data and 
2. change of state’s attitude towards the farmers, i.e. termination of tre-
ating the farmers as voters who need to be indulged and their treat-
ment as citizens who must obey the law or will be forced to do it.
These two changes do not go one without the other, i.e. they must be
implemented together. Since the accurate register records mean noth-
ing without the willingness of the state to ensure compliance with the
law, just as the willingness to use legal means to force the farmers to
participate in the mandatory pension insurance means nothing if there
are no valid register records.
Since there is no doubt that the main cause of the present difficulties
is negative attitude of the state, it should primarily pass a decision on
both changes – whether it intends and can perform them entirely. Half-
way solutions will not yield results.
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Register records
48. Regulating register records is a necessary precondition for the
good functioning of farmers’ pension insurance. It should be impleme-
nted by the Central Register of Mandatory Social Insurance, legalized
in May 2010,. It should comprise two operations: (1) creation of the cur-
rent data base of the insured farmers, with the necessary information,
and (2) creation of a reliable system for updating the register records
in the future.
Ad1. Law on the Central Register of Mandatory Social Insurance did
not foresee radical solutions for the creation of new, so–called unique
database, which will replace the Register records and include all rele-
vant information about clients and contributions. A new census for far-
mers, like the one implemented 25 years ago, is not planned. The possi-
ble solution is to take over the Register records of the PDI fund, and po-
ssibly update it from other sources. 
Central register12 could potentially update its base from two sources:
the Tax Office and Treasury Department. Since both have their records
related to farmers. 
49. Database of the Tax Administration is a database that occurred dur-
ing the establishment of pension insurance, and its update was even
weaker than the Register records one. Because it was changed only if
new information was provided by the insured, and for the purpose of
his/her needs. There is a significant number of dead, i.e. of those who
have ceased to be insured by their will or due to death, or transferring
to another insurance company, and the younger generation is not reg-
istered in this database either, that is those who later acquired the right
or obligation to be insured13.
Another Tax Administration database is the one with the data about
the farms, since they were needed for the assessment and collection of
taxes on cadastral income, and not about individuals on these proper-
ties, i.e. members of agricultural and mixed households. Besides, that
database itself is quite incorrect, because it has not been updated for
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12 Central register should begin to operate in late 2012. Until then an institution will be created, workers
hired, equipment and software obtained and other institutions' databases downloaded.
13 The Tax Administration database of the insured currently (May 2010) comprises 724 333 individuals.
This number also includes retired persons, and their exact number we could not establish. 
at least five years, since the tax on the cadastral income has not been
charged any more. Most importantly, individuals who have long since
died are still named as heads of many households, because the inher-
itance proceedings in Serbian countryside often remain uncompleted,
and therefore the cadastre and land books do not reflect the owner-
ship accurately.
50. The following possibility of updating the Register records is the Re-
gister of agricultural households. It was formed in 2005, driven by the
desire to create a registry similar to the Register of companies, and for
the purpose of creating a database on agricultural households that would
allow better planning of agricultural policy. Strong incentive for self–re-
gistering of farmers into the Register is the state policy in the field of agri-
cultural subsidies. Namely, the policy standard requires from the sub-
sidy users, i.e. the interested farmers, to enroll in the Register of agri-
cultural households. Otherwise it is not possible to apply for subsidy.
The register is technically managed by the Treasury Department of the
Ministry of Finance, while under regulatory terms it is under the Mini-
stry of Agriculture. Farmers apply at local branches of the Treasury De-
partment.
The basic features of this Register are as follows:
• the requirement for registration is at least 0.5 hectares of agricul-
tural land on which agricultural production is performed,
• all farms are entered in the Register, regardless of legal form, such
as those owned by farmers, entrepreneurs, companies, cooperati-
ves and other legal entities,
• as farmers are concerned, personal data of holders and members
of agricultural households are entered in the Register, as well as
the data on land holdings, plant crops and cattle, excerpt from
the cadastre and land registry as proof of ownership, etc.,
• entry in the Register is voluntary, so the farmers can, but do not
have to, register themselves and their farm,
• and when the agricultural household is actually entered, it is not
required to provided all stipulated data, so, for example, it is not
mandatory to enter household members , etc.
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• up to 2010, the household registration in the Register was per-
formed each year, while from 2011 it will be performed only if
necessary (if there are changes).
• the main incentive for the registration in the Register is of finan-
cial nature: the state agricultural subsidies are (mostly) paid only
to the households that are registered in the Register.
After an unsuccessful start, when
the number of registered house-
holds was small, in recent years
it has increased considerably: 
However, in 2010, number of reg-
istered households was reduced
by nearly one–third, according
to the preliminary data. Whether
the cause was reduced attractiveness of subsidies for farmers or incre-
ased control of the submitted documentation, as Ministry of Agricultu-
re claims, remains to be seen.
Although the above mentioned number refers to all types of farms, the-
re is no doubt that by far the largest number belongs to individual far-
mers and mixed households. Number of others (companies, cooperati-
ves and similar) is certainly small. 
Since it is generally estimated that there are 700–750 thousand farms in
Serbia, it would mean that the Register includes a substantial portion
of the total number, about one–half. There is no doubt that the Register
comprises wealthier individual farms that usually produce for the mar-
ket, with the ambition to modernize and increase crop and livestock
production. Only for households with larger market surplus the inclusi-
on in the system of state stimulations is meaningful. On the other hand,
among the households not entered in the Registry probably there are
poorer, less productive households, with small or nonexistent market
surplus, and consequently no state subsidies are sufficient bait for the
registration. Also those may be households with elderly people and
those less literate for whom collection of the registration documents re-
presents too big a task. If so, and probably that is the case, then the Re-
gister insufficiently includes the households and individuals that need
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Table 20. Number of registered 
agricultural households
date in thousands
31.12.2008. 420,4
31.12.2009. 441,9
April 2010. approximately 300
Source: Treasury Department, MoF; for 2010, Pres,
24.4.2010.
pension insurance the most, i.e. the households with modest human
and material resources.
The database of the Treasury Department, i.e. the Register of agricultu-
ral households, could, therefore, be a good supplement to Register re-
cords of the PDI fund, but it is still not the case. As: (1) entry in the Re-
gister is voluntary, and based on the application of farmers, which me-
ans that it does not cover all agricultural households and all their me-
mbers and (2) Treasury Department has no legal obligation to submit
their data to the PDI Fund, and it does not do so.
The question is whether it is possible to prescribe the obligation of reg-
istration in the Register of agricultural households. It would benefit the
farmers’ pension insurance, but it is probably not sufficiently strong
reason: Because: 
• Many farmers would not respond to the call for registration des-
pite the provisions on the obligation, just as they are also not re-
sponding to the obligation to pay pension contributions; the que-
stion is whether the state could compel them to register;
• Many older farmers are not skilled in the administrative procedu-
res, especially if they are accompanied by numerous papers, such
as registration in the Register of Agricultural Households (RAH)
is, and probably not even their good will would have a required
outcome; 
• Ministry of Agriculture, as the owner of the RAH, is not especial-
ly concerned for the registration of all agricultural households, i.e.
for those that do not participate in programs of agricultural sub-
sidies.
For these and similar reasons it is likely that the introduction of com-
pulsory registration would not ensure the desired outcome: the regis-
tration of overall agricultural population.
51. Ad 2. Adoption of a legal provision that would stipulate mandatory
and permanent cooperation between the Ministry of Agriculture and
the PDI Fund, i.e. Central Registry, on the transfer of the data from the
RAH to the PDI Fund, i.e. the Central Registry, is easy to perform and
it should be done at the earliest opportunity.
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There is one source of data that could solve all the aforementioned
major difficulties: the Serbian population census scheduled for 2011. It
will comprise a segment on the agricultural households and the popu-
lation living in them, with detailed data. Moreover, there is also a tech-
nically simple way to transfer data from the census database to anoth-
er one: the inhabitants will be registered with the ID number, and it
would be possible to use the census data for completing the database
of the insured farmers. 
Obstacle to this usage of census is legal regulations, since they, with
good reason, specifically prohibit the use of individual data from the
census for any purpose other than the prescribed analytical one. This
obstacle is not only formal, so it could be overcome by changing the
law, but it is also essential. If the census was at least once used for tax
and similar purposes, the population of Serbia would probably feel
cheated and would participate in the following censuses in the far
smaller number. Thus the idea of census being the method for obtain-
ing numerous information about Serbia, its citizens and their property
would be compromised and probably destroyed. Therefore that road
should not be taken.
Definition of insured person
52. The existing law on pension insurance defines the insured farmer in
an unclear and from time to time a very confusing way, so it should be
improved. Let us look at the entire Article 13 which deals with this issue:
Article 13 
(1) The insured – farmers are the persons who, according to the law,
are deemed to be in the agriculture business (farmers, members of the
farmer’s household and members of the mixed household), if they are
not: The insured who are employed, the insured who are self –
employed, pension beneficiaries and those in school.
(2) Household, in the sense of paragraph 1 herein, shall be deemed as
a unit of living, undertaking business activity, spending the income
generated by the work of its members, regardless of blood relation.
(3) The insurance is mandatory only for the head of the agricultural
household, i.e. at least one member of the household, while the other
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members of the household can be insured under the conditions pre-
scribed by this law.
53. A few comments:
• paragraph 1 speaks about the insured, with unclear content of
this notion; namely, it would be normal for the insured to denote
a person insured (the person paying contributions and acquiring
the right to pension), but here this is not the case by all means
since in paragraph 3 it is stated that only some of the insured are
insured by mandatory insurance while the others may get insu-
red, but do not have to; therefore the so called insured from para-
graph 1 are only candidates for insurance, i.e. they represent a
group of persons who can but need not become the «actual» in-
sured; here a technical amendment of paragraph 1 is needed, so
that the word «insured» is erased from the beginning of the text;
• a similar confusion exists with the notion of agricultural house-
hold; namely, paragraph 1 mentions farmer’s household (in addi-
tion to the mixed household), and paragraph 3 mentions agricul-
tural household; the question remains whether the two are iden-
tical or not; in case they are identical, then the mixed household
is not agricultural household (as it is mentioned separately in pa-
ragraph 1), thus the obligation regarding insurance in paragraph
3 does not apply to it, as it pertains only to agricultural households;
if not the same, then the mixed households would have to be includ-
ed in the group of agricultural households, as is the case now;
• the definition of farmer is not clear either; the Law says these are
„persons deemed by law to be working in agriculture“, which does
not explain a lot, more so since this «law» which used to resolve
the issue no longer exists; the current Law on Agriculture and Ru-
ral Development defines a farmer and a member of the agricultural
family household, inter alia, as a person inscribed in the Register of
agricultural households, which by all means does not fit the needs
of the pension law (there are farmers who are not inscribed in the
register, and are working in the field of agriculture and are insured); 
• in line with the above mentioned, it is unclear how to treat some-
one at the agricultural household who, in addition to working in
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agriculture, also works in another area, for example tourism or
food processing; and which insurance category should such per-
sons fall into: Farmers or self–employed or both? Do they choose
or does the Law prescribe the order etc. These are all unresolved
issues which need to be specified.
54. In addition, there is a serious issue regarding the inclusion of the
farmers’ pension insurance. The issue is as follows:
Firstly, there is a question on whether all those working in agriculture
should be kept in farmers’ insurance or if some of them should be tra-
nsferred to the insurance of the self–employed. Namely, in the Serbian
agricultural production there has for a long time been a small village
property, originating in the ancient times and further reduced in time
of socialist agrarian reform. This is the type of village and the type of
farmer for whom this farmers’ pension insurance was intended. 
However, recently there has been a change in the structure towards
stratification, so the villages are seeing the appearance of people that
cannot be described as traditional farmers who were intended to be
covered by farmers’ insurance, but who are entrepreneurs in agricul-
ture: they have sizeable plots of land (often through lease), processing
capacities, they hire labor, work with large buyers and such. Such indi-
viduals are unlikely to find interest in participation in the insurance
where one pays against minimum base to secure minimum pension. In
addition, prescribing for these entrepreneurs to pay against minimum
base brings pure financial loss for pension insurance, since their obli-
gation for contributions, if calculated according to the real economic
strength, i.e. earnings, would have to be manifold higher.
Therefore, the possibility should be examined for these individuals to
be transferred to self–employed insurance because it suits them more
with respect to the character of the work they perform, as well as rega-
rding the financial side of insurance. The base on which to pay the con-
tribution could be either according to the real income (earnings) or ex-
pressed as flat rate, but significantly higher than that of the insurance
of farmers.
55. Secondly, the inclusion of agricultural workers (hired/wage labor-
ers) into pension insurance is minimal. The reason is in the fact that
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this insurance is as a norm tied to the households and the household
property, so there are no serious attempts to include seasonal laborers
or those permanently working on someone else’s property and having
no property of their own. This is a serious problem for the poorest pop-
ulation group in villages, the group which is most in need for pension
insurance in old age.
Without a doubt the inclusion of agricultural hired labor into pension
insurance is absolutely necessary, but this is equally clearly very diffi-
cult to do. The reason is clear: these laborers are not registered any-
where and they receive their wages in cash, so that tax authorities have
no records of it. This is hard to expect in a country in which their boss-
es (employers) are hard or impossible to include in pension insurance.
However, in case the state of Serbia decides in favor of radical reform
of the pension insurance for farmers, what should be kept in mind is
that this segment of workers in agriculture exists.
56. Finally, the issue remains regarding the number of members of the
agricultural household who need to be insured. In the current law this
is only one member, as it is stated in the above mentioned paragraph 3.
However, in the draft of the new pension law prepared by the workgro-
up of the Deputy Prime Minister Krkobabic, it is foreseen that all mem-
bers of the household be mandatorily insured.
This solution would have some strengths: 
• It would put all active workers in agriculture in an equal position;
in other words, it would not create economic dependence in old
age of one farmer on the next (one spouse on the other),
• It would resolve the currently existing inter–generational prob-
lem: The heir of the agricultural property mandatorily becomes
insured only after the head of the agricultural household gets re-
tired, meaning not before roughly the age of 40; the heir thus has
very short pensionable service at the point of retirement, so that
the state needs to subsidize his pension.
However, there are serious weaknesses to this idea:
• It is unfeasible for as long as the Register records remain messy
and noncurrent and while there is no will on the part of the state
to strictly enforce the law on pension insurance and 
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• It would bring significant increase of the financial obligations of
the agricultural households, which would be tough on the poorer
households, and which would inevitably lead to additional redu-
ction of the participation of farmers in the pension insurance.
I believe that there is no doubt that this step makes no sense until man-
datory farmers pension insurance is reformed and put on firm founda-
tion. Only then could there be a consideration on whether to introduce
mandatory nature of insurance for all members of household or not. If
this provision is enacted prematurely, it would not have any positive
effect, but can only further discourage the farmers from participating
in insurance.
Contribution base
57. As mentioned, all insured farmers pay equal pension contribution
against the same, minimum base. This solution is chosen by necessity
after the cancellation of taxation of agriculture income in 2004, where-
by the only natural base for contribution was lost – that being the tax
base. The existing solution on equal base negates by all means the prin-
ciple of paying contributions based on the income of the insured, and
the pensions of farmers are inevitably equal for all. 
The equal base and equal pension do not suit many farmers of course.
The ones who are better off find the pension system unattractive as it
brings small pension. The poorer ones feel the prescribed contribution
is too high for them to pay, therefore they are left without a pension
and they are the ones who need it most. 
Since it is difficult to expect from state bodies (Tax Administration and
others) to undertake the enormous task of determining the income of
hundreds of thousands of households for the purpose of improved set-
ting of the amount of pension contributions, the only hope for the im-
provement of the base, i.e. for its harmonization with the income of an
individual or household is in reintroduction of agriculture income tax-
ation. 
58. Reintroduction of agriculture income taxation is by all means fair,
since the current state – in which this industry is completely exempt
from taxation – is extremely unfair. The existing solution is primarily a
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result of political pre–election calculations, and not based on any obje-
ctive reasons.
Without going into any details regarding the area of taxation of agricul-
ture income14, let us state that there are several options of taxation, dif-
fering in tax technique and demands on farmers and tax administra-
tion. Let us mention a few of the methods:
1. through the assessment of the real income of the agriculture ho-
usehold, based on the full book–keeping; 
2. through the simplified determination of income, based on simpli-
fied book–keeping; 
3. based on the value of land, i.e. based on the potential quality of
the land; 
4. based on cadastral income, which has been used for decades in
Serbia;
5. based on the assessment of tax administration.
These methods can be used simultaneously, for specific categories of
farmers. Thus the first method suits the largest farmers, as they need
to have good book–keeping due to their needs (financial planning), and
the last one suits the poorest ones (presumably they do not keep books,
very often they cannot fill in more complex tax returns). 
The expansion of the possibility of taxation compared to the earlier
period is aided by the gradual wider inclusion of farmers into the cash-
less payment system, especially the VAT system through the VAT fee,
which simplifies inclusion in the VAT system.
Penalty Provisions
59. The overview of the penalty provisions in the effective Law on Con-
tributions for Social Insurance shows that it does not foresee penalizing
of farmers who do not pay contributions. It explicitly lists fines payable
by the entrepreneurs, independent artists and their associations, chu-
rch officials and others, but the appropriate article on fines for the far-
mers not paying the contributions is missing. Thus the state has shown
that it is avoiding penalizing the farmers, i.e. it is giving them prefere-
ntial treatment compared to other obligors, with all the enumerated
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________________________________
14 Please refer to B. Mijatovic - Agriculture income tax, in Tax System Reform (2), CLDS, 2004 
consequences. This makes the job of Tax Administration easier since it
does not need to break the law when not going after those not paying
the contributions within the group of farmers insured.
Similarly, the new Law on Central Register of Mandatory Social Insurance
foresees the fines for failure to register and for incorrect registration, for
the employers (legal entities and physical persons), but not for farmers.
However, the law exists which forces the state i.e. Tax Administration
to go after and fine the farmers violating the law and not paying the
pension contribution: this is the Law on Tax procedure and Tax Admi-
nistration, which is the basic law in the field of public revenues. It pre-
scribes general procedure for those not paying the public revenues,
thus pension contributions as well. It provides for forced collection of
debts, which means that there is legal basis, but also a legal obligation
for Tax Administration to forcibly collect debts on farmers' social insur-
ance. 
The fact that Tax Administration does not force collect the debts from
the farmers obviously has political background. Because it is not an
independent state agency so that it has its own attitude towards an
issue of law enforcement, but an institution under the Ministry of Fina-
nce and receives orders from it (and hints). 
60. If the state wants to fix the situation in the pension insurance of far-
mers, it is inevitable, as we have already mentioned, to change the atti-
tude towards non–payment of pension contributions and start forced
and punitive measures that are otherwise part of the legal system of
Serbia in the fiscal area and applied to other defaulters not only related
to taxes but also contributions for social (and pension) insurance.
To do this, not much is needed, at least in formal terms:
• inclusion in the Law on Social Insurance Contributions of a clear
provision which provides for penalties for non–payment or late
payment of contributions by the farmers and
• application of the provision and stipulations of the Law on Tax
Procedure and Tax Administration on penalties and enforced co-
llection.
The former would supplement the legal framework necessary to fight
against non–payment, and the latter would exercise the legal options
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and bring about real action, not only to collect the previous debts, but
even more – to convince farmers that non–payment of contributions
does not pay. 
OPTION 2: CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
61. It is highly likely that the Government, although it wants to improve
the farmers pension insurance system and although there were some
efforts in that direction, may fail to improve the situation with this insu-
rance significantly, either due to the failure in exercising the huge ad-
ministrative work on the establishing a good pension system, or due to
the lack of political will to use enforcement and make the farmers pay
the contributions.
In such situation, it is probably the simplest solution to continue with
the current system and practice, speaking from the political perspec-
tive, and regardless of the numerous adverse effects. Political attrac-
tiveness of such orientation comes from the fact that there is no class
of the society interested in changes in any direction– in the direction
of radical reforms in order to create the real system of the mandatory
insurance or in the direction of abolishing the current system and prac-
tice. The farmers, as a class of society mostly interested in this issue,
are not very interested in participation in pension insurance, believing,
at least while they are young, that their property is their best pension.
Only the tiny minority among them wants the pension insurance, but
they are completely satisfied with its voluntary character. There is no
other class of the society which sees its interest in strengthening the
pension insurance system of the farmers; on the contrary, the interest
of the tax payers is not to pay more money in the budget only to be
paid to the farmers pensioners. And when there is no wider support
for some policy, expressed via potential voting on the next elections, it
is likely that there will be no such policy at all.
62. Prevailing of the option to carry on with the current system and
practice would result in adverse effects in many fields:
• in the field of undermining the concept of the mandatory pension
insurance which should ensure the adequate source of income
for farmers in their old age,
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• in the field of spreading the poverty among the aged people who
used to be farmers, since the other programs of social protection
do not cover the farmers and their families adequately,
• in the field of state finances, since the budget of the Republic will
continue to cover the expenses of this PAYG system which cea-
sed to be the PAYG system a long time ago.
Further situation with the pension insurance in this scenario would de-
pend on several factors:
• demographic and biological processes among the famers, which
would certainly lead to relatively quick reduction among the far-
mer population; that speed would be the result of calming down
of the previously intensive migrations from the villages to towns
on one hand, and fast aging of the village population, on the other,
• economic processes, which still result in reallocation of the labor
force from the primary into the secondary, and especially into
the tertiary sector,
• the restoration of trust of farmers in pension insurance system,
on the basis of its smooth functioing (regular payments of pen-
sions) in the following period and
• real conditioning of the farmers subsidies with the regular pay-
ments of contributions for pension insurance, with the efficient
prevention of avoidance of this duty.
Quantification of these factors is not possible, but the first two are like-
ly to prevail in the long–term over the others and the number of pen-
sioners and the insured will continue to decrease.
63. The continuation of the current tendencies will make one, seeming-
ly technical, problem even worse: interrupted line of the years of serv-
ice of the farmers who are entitled to pension. As we have already
seen, many of them have very small number of years of service at reti-
rement, so the question will be what should be done with the years for
which no contributions were paid. The problem here is not the calcu-
lation of pensions, or the threat that the calculated pension would be
lower due to the unpaid contributions (since the farmers will get the
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minimum pension anyway), but the problem is that in this way the for-
mal duty of the continuing pension insurance payment is undermined.
In the previous period that problem was solved using the ad hoc meas-
ures, via the so called stand–by years of service and via payment of
the debt through pensions, but those solutions are not enough in the
long–term. And there is no good solution:
• if the irregular payments of contributions are tolerated, it would
mean the breach of legal provisions which provide for the contin-
uous insurance,
• if the possibility of the interrupted line of the years of service is
formalized (i.e. allowed by law) it would mean that the mandato-
ry insurance system has turned into a voluntary one.
OPTION 3: ABOLISHING OF THE INSURANCE OF FARMERS
64. One of the options, as we have already mentioned, is the liquidati-
on of the mandatory insurance of farmers. This option is, in a way, a
defailt one – it is possible to be chosen if the other options prove to be
unacceptable or unviable. Thus, the assessment may be:
• It is not possible to recover the pension insurance of farmers as
described in the option 1 since 
1. it goes beyond the administrative capacities of the govern-
ment and the state,
2. farmers are not interested to be insured and they are stron-
gly opposing the insurance, avoiding participation, althou-
gh the system contains favorable solutions for them,
3. the government, due to political reasons, does not want to
enforce the farmers to pay contributions; this is a standard
weakness of the political elite towards the farmers, expre-
ssed also in abolishing the tax on income from agriculture
and establishing the wide program of subsidies in agriculture,
• The maintenance of the existing situation (option2) is unaccept-
able because
1. the mandatory insurance has turned into voluntary insur-
ance, which should not be organized by the state, 
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2. it is too costly for the state budget since the revenues from
contributions are constantly decreasing and the budget has
to cover higher and higher amounts, and the long–term per-
spectives are not favorable,
3. it demands significant administrative efforts, and there are
no tangible results.
65. Abolishing the existing type of insurance wouldn’t have to basical-
ly change the possibilities for pension insurance of farmers. The exist-
ing insurance has actually been voluntary in its nature, and those farm-
ers interested in pension insurance could opt for a voluntary private
insurance. Actually, there are different situations:
• New generations of farmers would freely decide whether they
need the pension insurance and in which fund they will pay con-
tributions, depending on the offered terms,
• The existing insured of the state owned pension fund could go to
private funds or give up the insurance altogether; the state would
provide them with the bonds they could use when they retire as
a compensation for the paid contributions; such compensation
would be fair and would have to exist,
• The existing pensioners would keep their status and would con-
tinue to receive pensions, completely financed from the budget,
• The old farmers without pension would still be entitled to social
aid.
If looked carefully, it is clear that options 2 and 3 are not that different:
in both options the farmers get voluntary pension insurance, and the
existing pensioners receive the pensions from the budget. The only
key difference is the following: in option 2, the new pensioners will still
receive significant subsidies from the tax payers, while in the private
insurance (option 3) they will not exist since the pensions are mostly
calculated on the basis of the contributions, and potentially on the ba-
sis of the investment returns as well. 
67. From the perspective of the public finances, the effects of this cha-
nge may be observed in the short–term and long–term:
• In the sort–term, the expense of financing the existing pensions
would increase in the amount equal to the contributions which
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used to be paid by the insured which would no longer exist if the
state insurance were abolished (2.36 billion dinars in 2009),
• In the long–term, the budget surplus is guaranteed since the ex-
pense of financing the existing pensions would gradually decrea-
se due to decrease in the number of pensioners for biological rea-
sons, while there would be no inflow of the new pensioners; on
the other hand, there would be a long–term expense for the com-
pensation bonds but that expense would be expanded in the long
period of time and would not be too excessive since the contri-
butions were not too high; thus the conclusion is that in the
long–term the budget would have a positive balance.
67. It is possible, after the mandatory pension insurance system for far-
mers has been abolished, to apply an alternative, completely new con-
cept: to create a system of social pensions for farmers. The farmers
would, when they reach certain age, be entitled to social pension whi-
ch would have nothing to do with the history of an individual in pensi-
on insurance, and would not be based on the paid contributions, but
would be a right of an aged person to get a state support regardless of
the fact if the person was insured or not.
The social pensions system exists in some highly developed countries
(Australia, Denmark, etc.). Its advantage is in providing an income for
the whole aged population, regardless of their working history, and
thus it eradicates the poverty of the aged people, but its disadvantage
its high price, i.e. it demands significant financial funds.
There are ways to partially decrease the expenses via targeting the
poorer groups of population. In other words, the social pension would
not be given to all aged people, i.e. it would not be a general right, but
only those who are proved to be unable to afford a modest living. This
reduced group of beneficiaries would certainly make the scheme chea-
per, but would make its administration more complicated: While with
the general social pension it is enough for somebody to submit an ID and
obtain an approval for a social pension, the procedures for identificati-
on of entitlement to targeted social pension are very complex and sus-
ceptible to manipulations.
In Serbia, the approval of social pensions for farmers would be conne-
cted with the political opposition of other groups of population, who
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would recognize in such a scheme an unjustified favoring of farmers on
the account of others. And they would be right. That is why the idea of
social pensions for farmers is not a realistic one.
The establishment of the social pension system for all the aged people,
in order to solve the problem of discrimination of some groups, is too
expensive and it is not realistic to expect Serbia to apply it in the near
future.
68. There is another possibility for additional support to the aged, poor
people, not included in the voluntary pension insurance, upon the
abolishment of mandatory pension insurance: it is social aid. Namely,
the social aid exists as a last option for support form the state to the
poor people who do not have enough for living. 
Although it is allegedly general in its character, i.e. intended for all the
poor citizens, the social aid is so regulated that it practically prevents
the farmers to be eligible to apply for it. Namely, the formal conditions
are the following:
• The candidate should not possess land above 0.5 ha as well as
other real estate, except for the house the candidate lives in,
• Those who possess the property above the regulated threshold
may be entitled to financial benefit only if they allow the center
for social work to sell or lease the surplus of property, and allow
the center to pay financial compensation out of those funds, or if
the owner of the property transfers the property to the Republic
without any compensation.
Those conditions seem as if they are made to repel the farmers to think
about the social aid. The request that a farmer should give up his prop-
erty (land and real estate) in order to be entitled to a modest social aid
is not acceptable for famers.
This solution is more suitable for the time when the employees in the
state and socially owned companies were the only ones entitled to var-
ious types of benefits, while the other groups were excluded. It is time
to change that practice. That is why the mentioned conditions for so-
cial aid for farmers should be relaxed, especially for the aged farmers
without pension. Even more so if we consider the fact the farmers are
not able to lease their property or sell it completely or partially, since
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in Serbia, especially in central and mountainous areas the demand is
weak and the prices are very low. Often, the properties cannot be sold
at all.
Of course, this strengthening of the social aid is possible under the op-
tion 2, as a support for those who do not opt for voluntary insurance.
Actually, as it has already been mentioned, the options 2 and 3 are
very similar, and in both the famers have the option to get involved in
the voluntary pension scheme or not. Thus, it would be useful to refo-
rm the social aid program in the favor of farmers regardless of the op-
tion chosen.
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